The Concept of Sāmānya in the Nyāya-Vaiṥeṣika System: A Critical Analysis

The concept of sāmānya (universal) is a central issue in both Indian and Western philosophy, concerning the nature of general concepts and their relation to particular objects. This study examines three major perspectives—nominalism, conceptualism, and realism—with special emphasis on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. While Buddhist nominalism rejects universals as mere names and conceptualism views them as mental constructs based on common attributes, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school upholds a realist position, asserting that universals are eternal, objective entities inhering in multiple particulars. The paper analyzes the defining features of universals, including eternality, commonness, and inherence, and explores the distinction between jāti (true universal) and upādhi (accidental property). It also evaluates Buddhist criticisms, particularly those of Dharmakīrti, against realism. The study concludes that although universals are essential for classification and cognition, their independent ontological status remains philosophically debatable.