A study of Nuclear Doctrine of India
| Vol-3 | Issue-09 | September 2018 | Published Online: 07 September 2018 PDF ( 153 KB ) | ||
| DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1435897 | ||
| Author(s) | ||
Uday Pratap Singh
1
|
||
|
1Assistant Prof, Iswar Saran P.G. College, Deptt of Defence & Strategic studies, University of Allahabad, Allahabad U.P. (India) |
||
| Abstract | ||
India’s Nuclear Doctrine states that a credible nuclear deterrence must be maintained but the means to achieve it have not been specified. If the nuclear deterrence fail then what would be the number and type of nuclear weapons India would require for a punitive second strike. Even if the framework of a nuclear force structure is arrived at then what would be the delivery systems that would be required to maintain the minimum credible deterrence? To maintain an effective credible nuclear deterrence as per our stated Nuclear Doctrine, India needs to maintain a specified number of nuclear weapons and build a reliable and effective triad for the deterrence to be credible. The concept of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ as stated in India’s nuclear doctrine is ambiguous and its meaning and exact definition has not been stated. Even if the numbers are ascertained the quantum of delivery platforms or a triad has not been clearly spelt. The author examines nuclear force structure in a dynamic security environment with emphasis on Pakistan and China and analysing the requirement of a triad for maintain a credible minimum deterrence and identification of challenges for India in its quest for a formidable triad. |
||
| Keywords | ||
| deterrence, massive retaliation, assumed destruction, Pokhran II, No First Use, tactical nuclear weapon, first strike, nuclear brinkmanship | ||
|
Statistics
Article View: 516
|
||


