

## Ibn-Sina Critique of Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Critical Study

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### ABSTRACT

*Ibn Sina's (Avicenna's) extraordinary venture of recreating the Aristotelian philosophical convention in a manner that concurs with his own comprehension of truth, clarifying and deciding the real essence, degree and point of mysticism involves a position of exceptional significance. In the *Ilahiyat (Metaphysics)* of *Kitab al-Shifa*, his most significant philosophical summa, Avicenna not just elucidates his own view about the mystical issues, yet additionally examines and clarifies the topic, substance and motivation behind power in an exhaustive manner. Along these lines, his way to deal with the topic of deciding topic of mysticism prompted certain methodological conversations and brought up a criticism by Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who took diverse situation on the point. Averroes condemns Avicenna's origination of the extent of mysticism and specifically his perspective on the connection among material science and power. Besides, he accuses Avicenna's situation for the issue to see if Averroes guarantee that Avicenna didn't follow Aristotle's assessment on the topic of transcendentalism is truly correct, and assuming this is the case, precisely how much. I will do this inside the system of Averroes contention, dissecting the essential purposes of his contention. In the principal area, I will manage the cases of Averroes, and in the second segment with Avicenna's perspective on the substance of mysticism in the light of the primary concerns of analysis by Averroes. What's more, in the last area, I will contrast Avicenna's origination and that of Aristotle's and presents the purpose behind the position taken by Avicenna.*

Averroes declares that mysticism utilizes certain standards showed in physical science. Also, the majority of the things that are pursued in transcendentalism are clarified by the things that are clarified in physical science and hypothesized then in mysticism. The metaphysician acknowledges, for instance, the presence of the First Principle from actual science and clarifies the way where it is a mover, similarly all things considered from numerical cosmology that he acknowledges the quantity of standards which exist as movers of the circles. As indicated by him, the metaphysician who acknowledges the main moving standards for the physicist has no real way to show the presence of a first mover except if he acknowledges it as something notable from the physicist. In this point of view, the examination concerning the presence of independent standards has a place with actual science, and not to the main way of thinking, as is said by Avicenna. Subsequently, the clarifications which Avicenna utilizes in his mysticism to set up the presence of the First Principle are generally rationalistic attestations, not by and large obvious, nor do they demonstrate anything in a proper way.

Averroes, who over and over keeps up that transcendentalism reviews and hypothesizes what has been clarified in physical science, expresses that since Avicenna accepts that no science can demonstrate its own standards and takes that totally, he erroneously feels that it is for the primary thinker to clarify the presence of the standards of the reasonable substance, if unceasing. Subsequently, Avicenna mistakenly says that, Averroes proceeds, the normal scholar proposes the presence of nature, and that the metaphysician demonstrates its reality. Averroes makes reference to that as per Aristotle the presence of nature is clear in itself and Avicenna isn't right when he says that the presence of nature

isn't known in common science and that it is transcendentalism which demonstrates its reality. For a proof of the presence begins at what is more known to us, the common marvels, and from these the presence of nature is self-evident. The reason for its reality might be given by power. (Averroes, 1983, pp.21-22)

Averroes who accepts that this mixed up origination was straightforwardly acquired from Alexander of Aphrodisias by Avicenna answers to this contention as follows,

...metaphysician is he who seeks what the principles of substance *qua* substance are and shows that the separate substance is the principle of the natural substance, but in explaining this problem, he takes over what has been explained in natural philosophy; as for the substance subject to generation and corruption, he takes over what has been explained in the first book of the *Physics*, namely that it is composed of form and matter; as for the eternal substance, he takes over what has been explained at the end of the eighth book, namely that the mover of the eternal substance is something free from matter...the existence of the eternal substance, the prime mover, has been established in the last book of the *Physics*, where it is not postulated, nor taken over from first philosophy. Therefore, the thesis that the investigation of the First Principle as the prime mover of the universe lies outside the scope of physics is in direct opposition to Aristotle. (Genequand, 1986, pp.74-75)

In his nullification of the proposition offered by Avicenna and the others before him, Averroes clarifies: Since by definition the First Principles themselves have no standards,

they can't be shown apodictically, that is, they can't be the objects of an apodictical exhibited which should begin from standards more widespread than that which it needs to illustrate; they can be shown up at by enlistment, which expounds general standards based on an assortment of specific applications, from a science lower in position. Consequently, it is wrong claim the tenet that no science can exhibit its own standards. Material science clarifies their reality as standards of the versatile substance, though transcendentalism investigations into them as standards of substance qua substance, not of the mobile substance. As indicated by Averroes, the standards of the two sciences are distinctive in the way one imagines them just, not in their being. Subsequently, the normal scholar clarifies the material and proficient motivations of the versatile substance; the formal and last causes are past his force. It is framing that perspective that the metaphysician looks for the components of the reasonable substance, which are the components of being qua being. Transcendentalism covers both reasonable and unceasing substance; nonetheless, if the object of mysticism and physical science is the equivalent, the method of request and the perspective from which this article is visualized are unique.

In this way, as indicated by Averroes, Avicenna additionally failed totally in his asserting that the normal logician can't clarify the way that the body is made out of issue and structure and in his reasoning that lone the metaphysician can attempt its clarification. As per the individuals who give themselves to the two sciences, for example the physical science and power, Averroes proceeds, it is clear in itself that every one of these cases are mistaken. As per Averroes, Avicenna doesn't think it workable for a science to demonstrate the standards of its subject, in light of the fact that a particularly evidence would need to utilize premises which are more essential than these standards and thusly have a place with higher orders. This isn't accurate, on the grounds that a proof of the reality of a rule; not an outright verification or a proof of the reason; is conceivable inside the science which has a subject the subject whose standard this is: in regular science one may demonstrate that essential issue and the First Mover exist, for a particularly evidence begins at the normal marvel and gets from them a clarifying guideline; giving a flat out confirmation has a place with transcendentalism.

In the *Ilahiyat* of his *Kitab al-Shifa* (Bertolucci, 2002) Avicenna draws a differentiation between the topic of transcendentalism and objects of request of mysticism. *Ilahiyat* are principally committed to the topic of what the topic of transcendentalism is. Avicenna adversely demonstrates that neither God nor the four causes are the topic of mysticism. The primary explanation is that their reality is demonstrated, not expected, by power. His chief theory here is that the topic of nay science should be as of now given as a hypothesize, preceding the examination of its inclination and properties. In this unique circumstance, Avicenna states,

The inquiry concerning would, then, have two aspects- one an inquiry concerning Him with respect to His existence and the other with respect to His attributes...For it is not for any science to establish its own subject matter...Since it has become clear to you from the state of this science that it investigates that are basically separable from matter. You have glimpsed in the natural sciences that God is neither a

body nor the power of a body, but that He is one-free in every respect from matter and from admixture with motion. Hence, the inquiry concerning Him must belong to this science. (Avicenna, 2005, p.4)

Then, Avicenna positively argues that the primary subject matter of metaphysics is existent *qua* existent; and the objects of inquiry of metaphysics are those that accompany the existent inasmuch as it is an existent, unconditionally. Thus, he divides 'this science' into parts:

Some of these will investigate the ultimate causes, for these are the causes existent with respect to its existence...Some will investigate the accidental occurrences to the existent, and some the principles of the particular sciences. And because the principles of each science that is more particular are things searched after in the higher science-as, for example, the principles of medicine in natural and surveying in geometry – it will so occur in this science that the principles of the particular sciences that investigate the states of the particular existents are clarified therein. (Avicenna, 2005, p.10)

Hence, Avicenna points out that metaphysics can prove the existence of the First principle without using particular sensible data, and relying rather on universal intellectual premises. In this respect, he says:

You ought to know that, within itself, there is a way to show that the purpose in this science is to attain a principle without another science. For it will become clear to you anon, through an intimation, that we have a way for proving the First Principle, not through inference from sensible things, but through universal rational premises that necessitate that there must be for existence a principle that is necessary in its existence...and that necessitates that of the whole. (Avicenna, 2005, p.16)

Avicenna maintains that certain topics and principles, such as God and the four causes, albeit dealt with in natural philosophy, are extraneous to this discipline and rather belong to metaphysics. In the *Ilahiyat*, after explaining the reason why the inquiry concerning God must belong to metaphysics, he states,

Hence, the inquiry concerning Him must belong to this science. What you have glimpsed regarding this in the natural sciences was foreign to the natural sciences used in them that does not belong to them. By this, however, it was intended to hasten for man the knowledge of the existence of the First Principle, so that the desire to acquire the other sciences would take hold of him, and [to hasten] his being drawn to the level...so as to reach true knowledge of Him. (Avicenna, 2005, p.4)

Here Avicenna makes two focuses: first, the examination of God relates appropriately just to power; second, the record of God given by characteristic way of thinking was strange to this control and spurred exclusively by didactical purposes. In such manner, Avicenna gives a long and itemized verification of the unfathomable length of time of the wonderful movement, intended to override the one gave in regular way of thinking. Presently, the unfathomable length of time of sublime movement is only the premise of confirmation's God's presence given by common way of thinking. Apparently Avicenna's point is to move from normal way of thinking to

transcendentalism the record of the eminent movement, accordingly denying characteristic way of thinking of the chance of demonstrating God's presence and, thusly, to manage God's inclination and related issues on that account. In the *Ilahiyat*, common way of thinking and power don't result to have unmistakable and free methods of demonstrating God's presence; just transcendentalism seems, by all accounts, to be the control deputed with demonstrating God's presence and managing heavenly issues.

Aristotle isolates *Metaphysics* predominantly into three sections: (1) the study of first standards, (2) the investigation of being qua being, and (3) religious philosophy. Avicenna knew about the above grouping of the substance of power. The comprehension of the extent of mysticism is apparent in his few works. Al-Farabi's exposition on the reasons for the *Metaphysics* gave Avicenna data about the issue. Specifically, it made him aware of the way that Theology is just a piece of power, not the whole subject. In this light Avicenna could recognize what he had before thought to be the Theological one. Along these lines, Avicenna disposed of outward adherence to the communicated types of Aristotelianism, he broke with custom which distinguishes Aristotelian mysticism with belief system. As Dimitri Gutas has brought up that Avicenna added a fourth measurement to this comprehension of the substance of *Metaphysics*, which managed the subject of the endurance of the normal soul. Gutas calls the last class of *Metaphysics* of the Rational Soul which incorporates disclosure and prediction, objective and the great beyond.

Along these lines the standards of material science, which are simultaneously the overall standards of being, are shown by the metaphysician and afterward taken over by the normal logician. Moreover, the guideline of actual things isn't itself something actual; it is the enduring substance. As per him, the metaphysician exhibits the standards of being whatever they are, and the relentless substance, as rule and reason for the actual world, is the essential object of power. Truth be told, what Aristotle says is simply that there is no showing of the main standard of an exhibition. From this, the pundits made the inference that first guideline of the specific sciences must be shown by a prevalent science that is power. With regards to which science shows the presence of nature as guideline of the regular things, Aristotle's assertion additionally is unsure. In *Physics*, Aristotle says,

Nature exists, it would be absurd to try proving; for it is obvious that there are many things of this kind, and to prove what is not is the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not. (Aristotle, 1995)

As indicated by the citation, it appears to be that common logician can capture the presence of nature just as show it; since the presence of nature which is 'intrinsic drive to development' is clear from encounters and needs no verification. To contend for its reality is placed oneself in the situation of a visually impaired man who needs to contend about shading since he can't capture straightforwardly.

To conclude I might want to say that Avicenna's logical reshaping of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* has been worked out in four principle territories. To start with, Avicenna explains what is the issue here, to be specific whether it manages God, or rather with existent being all things considered and its different highlights. Avicenna's answer is a blend between these two viewpoints: power is both philosophies, to the extent that existent qua existent is its topic, and a philosophy, since its objective is the information on God. Second, Avicenna re-evaluates the construction of transcendentalism in a deliberate manner, by excusing the fairly irrelevant request of books of the *Metaphysics*, and orchestrating this order as indicated by an exact epistemological example, just adumbrated in Aristotle. Third, he refines the technique for power, by improving its utilization of exhibits and phrased differentiations, presenting new strategies for argumentation like evidences by division and arrangement, and decreasing the job of systems like the analysis of past scholar's feelings, and the conversation of aporias related with logic. At last, he explains the relationship of mysticism arises to be a science higher than every one of these orders and encharged with giving their epistemological establishment. In the verifiable course driving from Aristotle to Avicenna a huge job is played by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who gets Aristotle's unaccomplished plan of a logical power and proves it in his discourse on the transcendentalism. Al-Farabi, analysts on the *Metaphysics*, and layouts logical arrangement of transcendentalism which Avicenna gets and, with huge adjustments and refinements, applies in the *Ilahiyat*.

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